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What Is a Life Worth in North Carolina? 
A Look at Wrongful-Death Awards 
RALPH PEEPLES* 
CATHERINE T. HARRIS** 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the amounts recovered in 123 wrongful-death cases 
filed in North Carolina over a five-year period.  The dataset is unique in 
that it includes both jury verdicts and settlements.  Although the injury—
death—was the same in each of these cases, the amounts recovered varied 
greatly.  Several patterns emerge from the data.  First, there is a strong 
negative correlation between age and the amount recovered.  Second, the 
manner in which the decedent died seems to make a difference.  Violent 
deaths, for example, led to larger recoveries than did nonviolent deaths.  
Third, jury verdicts produced much larger recoveries than did settlements.  
Finally, the results underscore the critical role of insurance in wrongful-
death cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
What is a life worth, expressed in dollars?  To most people, this 
question might seem odd, for several reasons.  One might ask why one life 
is worth more than another, or why and how the value of a life is to be 
expressed in dollars.  Placing a dollar value on a human life might seem 
distasteful to some, if not repugnant.  Even if this objection can be 
overcome, the second question remains: How can the value of a life be 
measured?  What method is appropriate?  For lawyers, however, these are 
routine and unsurprising questions.  When lawyers deal with these 
questions, they add an indirect phrase to come up with answers: following 
the guidance of wrongful-death statutes, they ask, “What is a life worth, 
expressed in dollars, to the deceased’s survivors?”  The effect on the 
survivors is the focus of most wrongful-death statutes and litigation. 
 
 * Ralph Peeples is a Professor of Law at Wake Forest University. 
 ** Catherine T. Harris is a Professor of Sociology at Wake Forest University.  We 
thank Matthew Barnes for his excellent research assistance.  We are grateful to attorney 
Robert M. Elliot for his many helpful comments and suggestions. 
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The focus of this Article is empirical.  The Article reports on the 
results from 123 wrongful-death claims asserted in North Carolina over a 
five-year period.  The dataset is unique, in that it combines information 
from both settlements and trials.  The dataset also includes results from 
wrongful-death claims regardless of the tort involved.  Disparate torts, such 
as motor-vehicle accidents, medical malpractice, intentional torts, and 
products liability, all contribute cases to the dataset.  This approach allows 
us to consider whether the way in which death occurs affects the amount 
recovered in wrongful-death actions.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A number of highly publicized attempts have been made in recent 
years to value a wrongfully taken human life.  The most obvious example 
is the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.1  Shortly after the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress established a compensation 
fund for those injured in the attacks and for the families of those killed.2  In 
the enabling act, Congress required consideration of the victims’ economic 
loss, thus making disparate awards inevitable.3   
More recently, General Motors proposed a schedule for compensating 
the families of individuals who died as a result of ignition-switch defects in 
vehicles manufactured by GM.4  Under the program, GM has proposed to 
pay a minimum of one million dollars for the death of each decedent, plus 
$300,000 for the surviving spouse and $300,000 for each surviving 
dependent of the decedent.5  These amounts establish a floor for the award; 
 
 1. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.1 to .81 (2014). 
 2. Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401–409, 
115 Stat. 230, 237–41 (2001), amended by James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 124 Stat. 3623.  The 2011 amendments reactivated the 
fund to compensate first responders and individuals who later experienced health problems 
related to 9/11. 
 3. Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act § 405(b)(1)(B), 115 Stat. at 238; see 
also 28 C.F.R. § 104.43.  The highest amount awarded from the fund was $7.1 million and 
the lowest was $250,000, with a mean award of over $2 million and a median award of 
almost $1.7 million.  See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? 156–57, app. at 202 
(2005); see also William Glaberson, Lawyer Math in Sept. 11 Deaths Shows Varying Values 
for a Life, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/11/national/ 
11DAMA.html?pagewanted=all (illustrating the perspectives of several personal-injury 
lawyers on the legal consequences of the 9/11 attacks).  
 4. See GM IGNITION COMPENSATION CLAIMS RESOL. FACILITY, www.gmignition 
compensation.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2015).  
 5. GM IGNITION COMPENSATION CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITY, FINAL PROTOCOL FOR 
COMPENSATION OF CERTAIN DEATH AND PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS PERTAINING TO THE GM 
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eligible claimants are also entitled to additional economic damages.6  
The subject has attracted occasional academic attention, but much 
depends on the discipline that is making the inquiry and the purpose for 
calculating the value of a life.7  For example, the approach taken by federal 
regulatory agencies varies from the approach that most lawyers take.  A 
regulatory analysis is usually based on a calculation of the risk involved 
and market data (how much one would require for accepting a more 
hazardous job, for example).8  In contrast, the approach used by most 
attorneys (and usually mandated by statute) is to determine what has been 
lost by the survivors, and then to place a value on that loss.  Attempts to 
collect and analyze results from actual cases are much less common, 
however.9  
Lawyers and juries grapple with the question of valuing a life in the 
context of wrongful-death actions.  In North Carolina, the starting point is 
section 28A-18-2 of the North Carolina General Statutes.10  This statute is 
only a starting point, however.  Much depends on the negotiations that take 
place prior to trial.  This Article reports on the differing values that various 
parties—insurers, attorneys, and occasionally, judges and jurors—have 
placed on a life wrongfully taken over the five-year period from January 1, 
2009, to December 31, 2013, in North Carolina. 
In law school, the subject of wrongful death usually comes up in first-
year torts class.  Most torts professors (one of the authors included), focus 
virtually all of the available class time on a simple binary question: Is the 
defendant liable to the plaintiff, or not?  The next question—assuming the 
defendant is liable to the plaintiff—asks, “What is the appropriate amount 
 
IGNITION SWITCH RECALL 6 (June 30, 2014), http://www.gmignitioncompensation.com/ 
docs/FINAL%20PROTOCOL%20June%2030%20%202014.pdf.   
 6. Id. at 5–6. 
 7. See James Ciecka & Seth Epstein, A Comment on the Use of Value of Life Estimates 
in Wrongful Death Litigation, 5 J. LEGAL ECON. 75, 79 (1995) (concluding that economics 
could provide only limited usefulness in applying value-of-life calculations for wrongful-
death actions). 
 8. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 
549–51 & tbl.2 (2005) (explaining how the United States Government assigns a dollar value 
to determine the value of a person’s life). 
 9. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling 
“Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 919–20 (1989) (data based on jury verdicts 
collected over a fifteen-year period in Florida and Kansas City); Frank Cross & Charles 
Silver, In Texas, Life Is Cheap, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1875 (2006); David W. Leebron, Final 
Moments: Damages For Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256 (1989); 
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 8. 
 10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (2013).   
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of damages?”  This question receives relatively little attention.11  This is 
unfortunate.  The question of “how much” will concern both parties 
greatly.  In practice, the question of “how much” may serve as a way to 
avoid answering the first question. 
The reasons for this approach are obvious.  The question of damages 
is a question for the jury.  Counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant may 
propose various amounts, but the jury makes the ultimate decision.  
Substantive standards for determining damages, when they exist, tend to be 
qualitative rather than quantitative in nature.12  In other words, nobody 
knows.  But most cases never advance to trial.  They are dropped, settled, 
or otherwise dismissed.  What about those cases?  For the cases that settle, 
the amounts are determined by negotiation, against the backdrop of the 
relevant statutes and case law—and the available amount of insurance.  
Negotiation need not be the equivalent of a black hole.  This Article 
examines the results of the negotiations that attorneys engage in when the 
cause of action is for wrongful death.  By examining the results and 
comparing them to the results from trial, perhaps a better understanding of 
what drives these negotiations will follow. 
II. THE RELEVANT LAW 
The starting point is the relevant statute, section 28A-18-2.13  That 
statute permits the personal representative14 of the decedent to bring an 
action for damages against the person or persons deemed responsible for 
the decedent’s death.15  The statute thus abrogates the common-law rule 
that an action for damages terminates with the death of the would-be 
plaintiff.16  The significance of the statute is that it specifies the damages 
available.17  The liability of the defendant remains a function of tort law.18 
 
 11. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: 
RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 155 (2010).  
 12. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9, at 910. 
 13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2. 
 14. A personal representative includes both an executor and an administrator of an 
estate.  Id. § 28A-1-1(5).  The personal representative is empowered to maintain an action 
for the wrongful death of the decedent by sections 28A-13-3(a)(23) and 28A-18-2(a).  Id. 
§§ 28A-13-3(a)(23), -18-2(a).  
 15. Id. § 28A-18-2. 
 16. DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 492 (N.C. 1987) (stating the common-law 
rule that the death of a human being could not be pleaded as an injury and that damages 
calculations must stop at the time of a person’s death); Christenbury v. Hedrick, 234 S.E.2d 
3, 5 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).  
 17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b). 
 18. Nelson v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 816, 818 (M.D.N.C. 1982). 
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 Section 28A-18-2 was enacted in 196919 to replace former section 
28-174.20  The statute expanded the grounds for recovery.  No longer 
limited to “such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the 
pecuniary injury,” the personal representative was permitted to recover 
compensation for medical and funeral expenses, the decedent’s pain and 
suffering, and the net income of the decedent, as well as compensation for 
the loss of the decedent’s services and companionship.21  These last two 
items include, but are not limited to, compensation for the loss of the 
decedent’s net income, service, protection, care, and assistance that the 
decedent would otherwise have provided, and the “society, companionship, 
comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice” that the decedent would 
otherwise have provided.22  A claim for loss of consortium may also be 
asserted under this provision.23  In addition, the statute permits the recovery 
of any punitive damages to which the decedent would have been entitled, 
as well as nominal damages “when the jury so finds.”24  
The focus of the wrongful-death statute also shifted with the 1969 
revision.  In contrast to former section 28-174, which permitted recovery of 
“such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury 
resulting from such death,”25 section 28A-18-2 requires consideration of 
the impact on the survivors in calculating recoverable damages.26  As the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals noted in Scallon v. Hooper,27 
compensation is intended to restore the survivors of the decedent to the 
same position that they would have occupied had there been no death.28 
The wrongful-death statute is exclusive.  It is the only way in which a 
beneficiary may recover for the wrongful death of the decedent.29  Other 
claims that are unrelated to the wrongful death of the decedent are to be 
 
 19. Act of Apr. 14, 1969, ch. 215, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 194 (relating to damages 
recoverable for death by wrongful act). 
 20. DiDonato, 358 S.E.2d at 492–93. 
 21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b); DiDonato, 358 S.E.2d at 492–93; see also Robert 
G. Byrd, Recent Developments in North Carolina Tort Law, 48 N.C. L. REV. 791, 804 
(1970). 
 22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(4). 
 23. See Keys v. Duke Univ., 435 S.E.2d 820, 821 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). 
 24. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28A-18-2(b)(5), (6). 
 25. Id. § 28-174 (repealed 1973). 
 26. Id. § 28A-18-2 (2013); Livingston v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 601, 606 
(E.D.N.C. 1993); Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co., 196 S.E.2d 789, 804 (N.C. 
1973).  
 27. Scallon v. Hooper, 293 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982). 
 28. Id. at 845. 
 29. Christenbury v. Hedrick, 234 S.E.2d 3, 5 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977). 
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brought under the “survivorship” statute.30  An action may be brought 
under the wrongful-death statute only by the personal representative.31  
Distribution of any recovery is governed by North Carolina’s Intestate 
Succession Act.32  Debts of the decedent, other than those for burial and for 
“reasonable hospital and medical expenses . . . incident to the injury 
resulting in death,” may not be paid from the amount recovered in a 
wrongful-death action.33  The case law is consistent on the point that 
recovery for wrongful death is not automatic: damages sought have to be 
proved.34  The statute provides that “[a]ll evidence which reasonably tends 
to establish any of the elements of damages [enumerated in the statute] is 
admissible.”35  Dying declarations of the deceased are also admissible.36  
In effect, section 28A-18-2(b) permits two types of recovery for 
wrongful death.  The first type includes medical and hospital expenses 
resulting from the injury that led to death, reasonable funeral expenses, and 
“[c]ompensation for pain and suffering.”37  Determination of these three 
items does not require any inquiry about the impact on the decedent’s 
survivors; it is no different from the calculations that would be needed in 
any personal injury claim.  The second category does, however, require 
consideration of the impact on the survivors.  The “present monetary value 
of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered” is 
what must be determined.38  Because of this directive, two calculations are 
necessary: first, a calculation of “present monetary value,” converting an 
imagined stream of income into current dollars,39 and second, a 
determination of the life expectancy of the decedent’s heirs.  The North 
Carolina courts have consistently done this by consulting actuarial tables to 
determine the longest life expectancy of the decedent’s heirs, and 
comparing it to the life expectancy of the decedent, if he or she were still 
 
 30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-1; see also State Auto Ins. Co. v. Blind, 650 S.E.2d 25, 
29 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
 31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(a); Bowen, 196 S.E.2d at 803. 
 32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(a).  The Intestate Succession Act is codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 29. 
 33. Id. § 28A-18-2(a); see also Bowen, 196 S.E.2d at 802–05 (discussing the effect of 
the 1969 amendments on the provision of funeral expenses); Byrd, supra note 21, at 803. 
 34. See, e.g., DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 493 (N.C. 1987); Bahl v. Talford, 
530 S.E.2d 347, 352 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). 
 35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(c). 
 36. Id. § 28A-18-2(d). 
 37. Id. §§ 28A-18-2(b)(1)–(3). 
 38. Id. § 28A-18-2(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
 39. This first calculation is often quite difficult.  While the concept of expressing future 
losses in terms of present dollars seems straightforward, opinions differ on the proper way 
to make this calculation.  See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9, at 911.   
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alive.40  If the life expectancy of the decedent is greater than the life 
expectancy of the heirs, the longest life expectancy of the heirs is used.41  
For example, imagine a case in which a forty-year-old woman dies, leaving 
as her sole survivor a nine-year-old son.  Because the life expectancy of the 
son is greater than the life expectancy of the mother, the mother’s 
remaining (theoretical) life expectancy would be used; in terms of “present 
monetary value,” the son could expect no more than that.  Likewise, if the 
nine-year-old son died, present monetary value would be measured in terms 
of his mother’s remaining life expectancy rather than his own. 
The statute permits the recovery of both economic (medical and 
hospital expenses, funeral expenses, and future net loss income) and 
noneconomic damages (the deceased’s pain and suffering between injury 
and death, loss of services and loss of society and companionship).  In this 
sense, it follows general principles of tort law.  This means, however, that 
an element of uncertainty exists in any wrongful-death action.  Calculations 
of the “present monetary value” of the deceased’s pain and suffering, the 
loss of services, and the loss of society and companionship defy 
quantification.42  
If not resolved by negotiation, the question of present monetary value 
will ultimately be decided by a jury.  Set out below are the North Carolina 
Pattern Jury Instructions43 for this question.  The instructions suggest that 
the task will not be an easy one: 
  Damages for (named deceased)’s death also include fair compensation 
for the present monetary value of (name deceased) to his next-of-kin. . . . 
  There is no fixed formula for determining the present monetary value 
of (name deceased) to his next of kin.  You must determine what is fair 
compensation by applying logic and common sense to the evidence.  You 
may consider: 
  [The net income (name deceased) would have earned during the 
remainder of his life.  You must subtract from (name deceased)’s 
 
 40. See, e.g., Livingston v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 601, 605 (E.D.N.C. 1993) 
(holding that “[e]conomic loss is calculated by the income of the decedent over the greatest 
of the life expectancies of his survivors”); Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co., 196 
S.E.2d 789, 806 (N.C. 1973) (“[T]here can be no recovery . . . beyond the life expectancy of 
the last surviving parent.”). 
 41. Bowen, 196 S.E.2d at 805. 
 42. The task of converting pain and suffering into a monetary amount is a problem in 
tort law generally.  See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A 
Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. 
REV. 773, 781 (1995) (acknowledging that “pain and suffering” is required to be calculated 
as a form of compensable damages in personal injury actions). 
 43. N.C. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES 810.50 (2015), 
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/pji-master/civil/c810.50.pdf. 
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reasonably expected income the amount he would have spent on himself or 
for other purposes which would not have benefited his next of kin.  The 
amount he would have earned depends upon his prospects in life, health, 
character, ability, industry and [the means he had for making money] [the 
business in which he was employed].  It also depends upon his life 
expectancy—that is, the length of time he could reasonably have been 
expected to live but for the [negligence] [wrongful conduct] of the 
defendant.] 
  [The services, protection, care and assistance of (name deceased), 
whether voluntary or obligatory, to his next-of-kin.  These words are to be 
given their ordinary meanings.  You may consider the family and personal 
relations between (name deceased) and his next-of-kin, and what you find 
to be the reasonable value of the loss to them of these things over the life 
expectancy of (name deceased). . . .] 
  [The society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and 
advice of (name deceased) to his next-of-kin.  These words are to be given 
their ordinary meaning.  You may consider the family and personal 
relations between (name deceased) and his next-of-kin and what you find 
to be the reasonable value of the loss to them of these things over the life 
expectancy of (name deceased). . . .] 
. . . . 
  Any amount you allow as damages for the future monetary value of 
(name deceased) to his next-of-kin must be reduced to its present 
value . . . .44 
The instructions certainly are faithful to the statute and the case law, 
but they do not provide much guidance.45  One might argue that these, or 
any, jury instructions are incapable of providing guidance, since the jury is 
being asked to convert items for which there is no market (such as pain and 
suffering, loss of society, and loss of services) into money.46   
Livingston v. United States47 illustrates how the statute works in 
practice.  David Livingston was killed in a motor-vehicle accident when the 
 
 44. Id. (footnotes omitted) (brackets in original). 
 45. This lack of guidance seems to be the case across all jurisdictions.  See Leebron, 
supra note 9, at 265 (“The law provides no guidance, in terms of any benchmark, standard 
figure, or method of analysis, to aid the jury in the process of determining an appropriate 
award.”); Joseph Sanders, Why Do Proposals Designed to Control Variability in General 
Damages (Generally) Fall on Deaf Ears? (And Why This Is Too Bad), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 
489, 501 (2006) (“The primary impediment to achieving greater consistency is the vague 
guidance jurors receive on what is to be compensated and a complete absence of guidelines 
for how to translate this into dollar awards.”). 
 46. Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 765 (1995). 
 47. Livingston v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1993). 
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car that he was driving was struck by a truck driven by an Air Force 
serviceman.48  Livingston was thirty-one years old, unmarried, and 
survived by only his parents.49  He worked as the manager of a used-car 
business that was owned by his father.50  Livingston’s earnings history was 
erratic; his annual income varied between less than $1,000 to as much as 
$22,620 over the years.51  Although the United States did not contest 
liability, the parties were unable to agree on the appropriate damages 
award.52  As a result, the case was tried in federal court without a jury.53  
The opinion by Judge Howard nicely shows how section 28A-18-2 
operates.  The “net income” damages of $20,000 awarded by the court 
were quite modest, based on Livingston’s income and on his father’s life 
expectancy of thirteen years.54  Likewise, medical and funeral expenses 
totaled only $11,200.55  Livingston’s pain and suffering from the time of 
the accident to the time of his death was set by the court at $10,000.56 
On the question of loss of services, protection, care, and assistance, 
the court awarded $75,000, and for the loss of society, companionship, 
comfort, and guidance, the court awarded $150,000.57  Both of these items, 
like net income, were calculated according to “the present monetary value 
of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered.”58  
The point is a simple one: the statute contains categories that can be 
calculated with relative precision (such as net income, medical expenses, 
and funeral expenses), as well as categories that defy measurement (such as 
pain and suffering, loss of services, and loss of companionship).  Since the 
statute permits both economic and noneconomic damages, this is no 
surprise.  This combination of factors—some capable of calculation, others 
not—suggests that much depends on the negotiating skill of the attorneys. 
III. METHODS 
To construct a useful set of North Carolina wrongful-death cases in 
which the decedent’s life is explicitly valued, we conducted searches of 
 
 48. Id. at 602. 
 49. Id. at 603. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 602. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 607. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 608. 
 58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(4) (2013); Livingston, 817 F. Supp. at 604. 
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multiple online databases, cross-checking the results to avoid duplication.  
We also researched the North Carolina appellate reports for the relevant 
time period.  In addition, we reviewed the closed files of a major medical-
malpractice insurer.59  Over the five-year period from January 1, 2009, to 
December 31, 2013, we identified 123 wrongful-death cases, resolved 
either by trial or by settlement.  The fact that our data are drawn from both 
trials and settlements makes this study different from most other empirical 
studies on this subject.60 
Several of these cases involved multiple deaths.  To avoid 
overweighting a single case, we chose a single plaintiff in each of those 
cases.  From the online reports and the closed claim files, we gathered all 
the information available about the deceased plaintiff, his or her survivors, 
the manner of death, and the amount recovered.  In the course of the 
research, it became clear that many wrongful-death cases result in no 
recovery at all.  Because our analysis is concerned with determinations of 
the value of a life wrongfully taken, however, we confine our discussion to 
those cases in which some amount of money was in fact recovered.  
Our analysis is aided by the fact that North Carolina is a contributory-
fault jurisdiction.61  In a tort based on negligence, any “fault” attributed to 
the plaintiff will bar his or her recovery.62  This means that the verdicts and 
settlements discussed in this Article require no adjustment for comparative 
fault, since comparative fault does not exist in North Carolina.  The 
amounts agreed to, or as found by the jury, thus represent the monetary 
value of a particular decedent’s life.63 
We cannot be certain that we have identified all of the wrongful-death 
resolutions in North Carolina between 2009 and 2013 that resulted in a 
monetary recovery.  Regarding settlements, we identified the cases in 
 
 59. We were given unrestricted access to the closed claim files of a major North 
Carolina medical liability insurer.  The closed claim files contained information about the 
injury alleged, the medical specialty involved, the insurer’s assessment of the liability of its 
insured, and basic demographic information about the claimants, along with information 
about the final disposition of the claim.  
 60. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9; Leebron, supra note 9 (looking only at trial 
outcomes); see also Cross & Silver, supra note 9 (making use of the Texas Closed Claim 
Database—a very large collection of closed insurance files—but not trials, in their study).   
 61. See Holderfield v. Rummage Bros. Trucking Co., 61 S.E.2d 904, 906 (N.C. 1950); 
Moore v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Works, 111 S.E. 776, 777 (N.C. 1922).  See generally 
CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS ¶ 19.20[1][a], at 
384–86 (3d ed. 2012). 
 62. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 463 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
 63. But this statement has one qualification: in 2011, the General Assembly imposed a 
$500,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical-malpractice cases.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 90-21.19.  
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which a report was published by the various verdict and settlement 
reporting services.  These services rely on counsel (usually plaintiff’s 
counsel) to report the outcome.  As a result, case selection certainly 
occurred.  Because of this bias, we do not claim that the data represent 
either all of the relevant cases, or a valid random sampling of the cases. We 
believe, however, that we have identified a large-enough group of cases to 
be representative of all the wrongful-death cases resolved during the five-
year period from 2009 to 2013.   
Our data also requires a further qualification: otherwise-useful 
information is often omitted in the verdict and settlement reports in 
compliance with a confidentiality agreement.  Names of the parties, names 
of the decedent’s survivors, and the names of defense counsel are 
occasionally omitted.  The race of the deceased is almost never included in 
settlement reports.64  We have attempted to supplement missing 
information whenever possible. 
IV. RESULTS 
We report on 123 cases from forty-six of North Carolina’s one 
hundred counties.  Wake County had the highest number of wrongful-death 
cases and settlements, followed by Mecklenburg County.  Almost all of the 
cases (n=108) were filed in the North Carolina Superior Court.  The three 
federal district court divisions in North Carolina accounted for five cases,65 
and six cases were resolved prior to commencement of a lawsuit.66  In two 
cases, we were unable to identify the court, and one case came from the 
North Carolina Industrial Commission.67  
 
 64. The race of the deceased, like the age and gender of the deceased, would certainly 
be a relevant factor in any analysis of wrongful-death awards.  This information, however, is 
rarely included in jury verdict and settlement reports.  The use of race-based tables to 
calculate damages for wrongful death is controversial.  See, e.g., McMillan v. City of New 
York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that using race to determine damages in 
a wrongful-death action violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
United States Constitution). 
 65. Great W. Cas. Co. v. Fredrics, No. 1:10-cv-00267 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 1, 2012); 
Fontenot ex rel. Turner v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00125 (W.D.N.C. July 19, 2011); 
Lumsden v. United States, No. 7:06-cv-00060-F (E.D.N.C. Nov. 1, 2010); Parker v. Bladen 
County, No. 7:08-cv-00069 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 2010); Hines v. United States, No. 1:07-cv-
00288 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2009). 
 66. E.g., Estate of Murphy v. Bellamy (settlement reached Sept. 27, 2013) (LEXIS, 
American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch). 
 67. Estate of Harbin v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., I.C. No. TA-22283 
(N.C. Indus. Comm’n Nov. 5, 2013); see Amber Nimocks, Verdicts & Settlements 
November 15, 2013: State-Administered Overdose Results in $528K Award, N.C. LAW. 
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A. Type of Death 
There are many ways to die, and our data reflect that fact.  Not 
surprisingly, the most common cause of death was motor-vehicle 
collisions.  Of the thirty-two cases involving motor-vehicle collisions, at 
least three involved driving while impaired, which added another potential 
defendant in those cases—the establishment that served alcohol to the 
driver.68  One case involved a motorboat collision in which at least one of 
the operators was allegedly under the influence of alcohol.69  The second 
most common cause of death was perhaps more of a surprise: eight deaths 
were caused by radiologists’ misreadings of X-rays or CT films.70  Other 
medical-diagnostic errors across various specialties accounted for eleven 
deaths.71  Four decedents died from gunshot wounds,72 two died from burns 
and smoke inhalation,73 one from strangulation,74 and another from a 
stabbing.75  There were two instances of cardiac arrest induced by a Taser 
gun.76 
 
WKLY. (Nov. 15, 2013).  The authors did not conduct a separate search of the awards made 
in workers’-compensation cases. 
 68. See, e.g., Estate of Anonymous 23-Year-Old Female v. Anonymous Driver (N.C. 
Super. Oct. 26, 2009); Davis v. Brown, No. 04-CVS-1183 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 2009). 
 69. Anonymous Decedent’s Estate v. Anonymous Boater (N.C. Super Ct. May 6, 
2010). 
 70. Results on file with author (settlements involve confidential data from major 
medical-malpractice insurer in North Carolina). 
 71. See, e.g., Smalls v. W. Carolina Univ. (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2012) (LEXIS, 
American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); Anonymous 62-Year-Old Male v. 
Anonymous Dermatopathologist (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2012) (LEXIS, American Lawyer 
Media (ALM) VerdictSearch) (failure to diagnose rare cancer); Plaintiff v. Defendant 
Surgeon, 2010 WL 9446841 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 2010) (negligent follow-up surgery 
following bariatric surgery). 
 72. See Kluttz v. Town of Spencer (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 2012) (LEXIS, American 
Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); Arrington v. Martinez, No. 06 CVS 17916 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2012); Blevins v. Hammer, No. 09CVS398 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 
2011); Estate of Caskey v. Estate of Campbell, No. 09-CVS-4836 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 
2010) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch). 
 73. See, e.g., Decedent v. Apartment Complex (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2010) (LEXIS, 
American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch). 
 74. Estate of Doe v. XYZ Med. Ctr. (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2013) (LEXIS, American 
Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch). 
 75. Estate of Williams v. ACC/Merritt, LLC, No. 08-CVS-12969 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 
11, 2010) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch). 
 76. Fontenot ex rel. Turner v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00125 (W.D.N.C. July 19, 
2011); Parker v. Bladen County, No. 7:08-cv-00069 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 2010). 
12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss3/8
2015] WHAT IS A LIFE WORTH? 509 
B. Type of Resolution  
Settlements greatly outnumbered every other category of resolution.  
There were one hundred settlements, fifteen jury trials, and three bench 
trials.77  One case was settled after a jury trial.78  The remaining four cases 
were either agency awards or a combination of settlement and default 
judgments.79  
C. Age, Gender, and Marital Status of the Deceased  
The deceased ranged in age from stillborn infants80 to age ninety-
three.  The average age was 45.6 years (median forty-four years).  There 
were fifty-nine males and sixty-two females.81  Fifty-four of the decedents 
were married; twenty-one were single; eight were divorced; three were 
widowed; and thirteen were minors.82  
D. Amount Recovered  
We were able to ascertain the amount recovered by the plaintiff in all 
but one case.83  In obtaining the amount recovered, we encountered twelve 
cases in which the amount recovered was not clearly “global,” meaning 
that other sources of compensation may have existed.  As a result, we 
report on “global” and “non-global” results separately.84  There were also 
several cases that involved more than one decedent.  When individual 
allocations of the wrongful-death awards were not available, we divided the 
total amount recovered by the number of decedents to arrive at the amount 
recovered. 
 
 77. Complete list of results on file with author.    
 78. Results on file with author. 
 79. Results on file with author. 
 80. Under North Carolina law, wrongful-death damages are available for the death of a 
viable but unborn child.  See DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 493–94 (N.C. 1987). 
 81. In two cases, we were unable to determine the gender of the deceased.  In twenty-
four cases, we were unable to determine the marital status of the deceased.   
 82. Because jury verdict and settlement reports and court records do not routinely 
report the race of plaintiffs or defendants, we were unable to collect sufficient data to report 
on these demographic variables.  
 83. Estate of Majlaton v. Lutz, No. 10-CVS-021416 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2012) 
(LEXIS, Dolan Media Verdicts & Settlements). 
 84. We labeled a case “global” if we were confident that all potential defendants had 
participated in the settlement, or in the case of a trial, were named and made subject to the 
court’s jurisdiction.  “Non-global” resolutions are cases with only partial settlements, as 
well as cases in which there was reason to believe that other potential defendants might be 
involved.   
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We included only one decedent in multiple-decedent cases in our 
dataset to avoid overstating the amounts recovered.  In most multiple-death 
cases, the amount recovered per decedent was relatively high; including all 
decedents in these cases would have produced a higher number of cases, 
but it would also have distorted the average and median amounts 
recovered.  
E. Insurance  
Most defendants were insured, but some were not.85  The absence of 
insurance makes actual payment less likely and may explain why most of 
the defendants had insurance.  An attorney would likely hesitate to bring a 
wrongful-death action against an uninsured defendant because the attorney 
would wonder about the chances of collecting any amount recovered.   
The existence of insurance raises an additional question: To what 
extent does the amount of coverage determine the amount recovered?86  
The amount recovered varied greatly, ranging from a low of $4,000 to a 
high of $10,665,000.  Figure 1 below illustrates the dispersion in the 
results. 
 
Figure 1: Award Amounts 
 
 
 
 85. Defendants were uninsured in eleven of the cases used in our results.  We included 
in the “uninsured” category cases in which it appeared that the defendant was substantially 
underinsured.   
 86. See infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.  
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As Figure 1 shows, the amounts recovered are highly skewed.  Put 
another way, the results from the cases raise questions of horizontal 
equity87: if the severity of the injury (in this study, death) is the same, what 
explains the variation? 
 When only global cases are considered, the range remains impressive, 
from a low of $9,000 to a high of $10,665,000.  For the 110 cases in our 
study, the mean award was $1,300,740, and the median was $590,000.  
Jury verdicts produced numbers much higher than did settlements, as Table 
1 shows.  When only “global” cases with insurance available were 
examined, the difference between trial and settlement outcomes remained 
substantial. 
 
Table 1: Jury Verdicts and Settlements 
 
Type of 
Resolution 
Mean and Median 
Recovery 
Amounts for All 
Cases 
Recovery Amounts 
for Global Cases 
Recovery Amounts 
for Global Cases 
with Insurance 
Jury verdict  Total Cases: 15 
Mean: $3,128,872 
Median: $2,224,080 
  
Total Cases: 15 
Mean: $3,128,872 
Median: $2,224,080 
Total Cases: 11 
Mean: $3,004,454 
Median: $2,000,000 
Settlement  Total Cases: 99 
Mean: $779,757 
Median: $490,000 
 
Total Cases: 88 
Mean: $853,533 
Median: $500,000 
Total Cases: 86 
Mean: $850,022 
Median: $500,000 
 
Ninety-two different attorneys represented the 123 estates.  Only five 
attorneys represented three or more plaintiffs.  There were fewer defense 
attorneys, for two reasons.  First, the identity of defense counsel was often 
not disclosed.  Second, defense attorneys were more likely to be repeat 
players.  Dividing the number of cases in which the identity of plaintiff’s 
counsel was known (123) by the number of different plaintiff’s counsel 
(92) produces an average number of cases per attorney of 1.337.  Dividing 
the number of cases in which the identity of defense counsel was known 
(77) by the number of different defense counsel (43) produces an average 
number of cases per attorney of 1.791.88    
We identified eight cases in which the defendant was a nursing 
home.89  The amounts awarded varied greatly, from a low of $85,000 to a 
 
 87. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9, at 924.  
 88. In three cases, the defendant was not represented by counsel. 
 89. See, e.g., Rice v. Britthaven, Inc., No. 2010-CVS-000099 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 
2012); Estate of Baker v. Britthaven, Inc., No. 10-CVS-690 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 2012) 
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high of $1,635,000 (a mean of $650,000 and a median of $440,000).  This 
range seems curious, since residents of nursing homes tend to be elderly 
and unemployed.  
Men fared better than women.  The average “global” award for men 
was $1,408,596 (a median of $600,000), while the average “global” award 
for women was $1,203,841 (a median of $590,000).  The average award for 
minors was $1,304,667 (a median of $700,000). 
The marital status of the deceased made a difference as well, as shown 
in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Marital Status and Amount Recovered 
 
Marital Status Number of 
Cases 
Mean and Median “Global” 
 Recovery Amounts 
Single 19 Mean: $2,082,245 
Median: $860,000 
 
Married 50 Mean: $1,306,824 
Median: $600,000 
 
Divorced 5 Mean: $259,400 
Median: $185,000 
 
Widowed 3 Mean: $108,333 
Median: $75,000 
 
Minor 10 Mean: $1,374,200 
Median: $753,750 
 
 Total = 88  
 
The results for decedents with no income—i.e., infants, children, 
unemployed and disabled adults—illustrates how open-ended the inquiry 
often is.90  The dataset contains twenty-seven cases of decedents with no 
income in which the amount recovered represented a “global” resolution 
(meaning that there are no other defendants in cases still pending).91  The 
 
(LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); Alzheimer’s Patient v. Nursing 
Home (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2010) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) 
VerdictSearch); Estate of Odom v. Aston Park Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 08 CVS 2268 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); 
Anonymous 81 Year Old Female v. Anonymous Nursing Home (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 
2009) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch). 
 90. Results on file with author. 
 91. See supra Table 2. 
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awards ranged from a low of $70,000 to a high of $4,160,000, with a mean 
of $988,963 and a median of $700,000.92  In these cases, “net present 
income” would presumably be at or near zero.  Having an income produced 
a higher average amount recovered ($1,402,162), but the median amount 
was lower than the median amount for decedents with no income 
($575,000).93   
There is some evidence that the perceived character of the deceased 
affects the amount recovered.  In six cases, we found indications from the 
reports that the deceased was of doubtful character or was engaged in 
unsavory conduct.94  The mean and median awards in those six cases were 
$387,097 and $397,319, respectively—far below the corresponding awards 
for the cases in which there was no indication of unsavoriness conduct or 
character (a mean of $1,353,450 and a median of $600,000).  On the other 
hand, when the deceased could be characterized as a crime victim, the 
amounts recovered were higher (a mean of $1,815,155 and a median of 
$1,786,000 in twenty cases) than for those who could not be so 
characterized (a mean of $1,186,426 and a median of $533,973 in ninety 
cases).    
Slightly less than half of the cases (sixty-one cases) arose as medical-
malpractice claims.  Motor-vehicle accidents accounted for thirty-two 
cases.  Three of those cases involved a combination of motor-vehicle 
accidents and dram-shop liability.95  There were sixteen cases of death by 
negligence other than medical malpractice and motor-vehicle accidents.  
Twelve cases arose as intentional torts—specifically, assault and battery.96  
 
 92. See supra Table 2. 
 93. See supra Table 2. 
 94. See, e.g., Parker v. Bladen County, No. 7:08-cv-00069 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 2010); 
Kluttz v. Town of Spencer (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 2012) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media 
(ALM) VerdictSearch); Anonymous 29-Year Old Female v. Anonymous Dump Truck 
Driver (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2012) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) 
VerdictSearch); Jones v. Underwood, No. 10CVS1966 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 2011) 
(LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); Estate of Harbin v. N.C. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., I.C. No. TA-22283 (N.C. Indus. Comm’n Nov. 5, 2013). 
 95. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 96. See, e.g., Estate of Doe v. XYZ Med. Ctr. (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2013) (LEXIS, 
American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); Arrington v. Martinez, No. 06 CVS 17916 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2012); Blevins v. Hammer, No. 09CVS398 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 
11, 2011); Estate of Caskey v. Estate of Campbell, No. 09-CVS-4836 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 
20, 2010) (LEXIS, American Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch); Estate of Williams v. 
ACC/Merritt, LLC, No. 08-CVS-12969 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2010) (LEXIS, American 
Lawyer Media (ALM) VerdictSearch). 
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Finally, there were two cases involving products liability.97  
The data suggest that how the deceased died makes a difference in 
terms of the amount recovered in a subsequent lawsuit.  Sorted by cause of 
action, and restricting the analysis to “global” cases, Table 3 sets out the 
mean and median awards in each category.   
 
Table 3: Cause of Action and Amount Recovered 
 
Cause of 
Action 
Mean and Median 
Recovery Amounts 
for All Cases98 
“Global” Cases “Global” Cases 
with Insurance 
Motor-
Vehicle 
Accidents 
Total Cases: 32 
Mean: $1,390,522 
Median: $1,292,500 
Total Cases: 29 
Mean: $1,524,507 
Median: $1,400,000 
Total Cases: 25 
Mean: $1,284,449 
Median: $1,250,000 
 
Medical 
Malpractice 
Total Cases: 60 
Mean: $841,650 
Median: $400,000 
Total Cases: 52 
Mean: $934,692 
Median: $400,000 
Total Cases: 52 
Mean: $934,692 
Median: $400,000 
 
Other 
Negligence 
Total Cases: 16 
Mean: $1,060,665 
Median: $484,819 
Total Cases: 15 
Mean: $1,131,109 
Median: $500,000 
Total Cases: 13 
Mean: $689,741 
Median: $469,638 
 
Intentional 
Torts 
Total Cases: 12 
Mean: $1,750,007 
Median: $1,300,000 
Total Cases: 12 
Mean: $1,750,007 
Median: $1,300,000 
Total Cases: 7 
Mean: $1,313,857 
Median: $580,000 
 
 
Within each category, we found widely dispersed results.  The mean 
and median recovery amounts within the four causes of action indicate, 
however, that lives are valued differently, and that one factor in explaining 
the difference is how the deceased died.  Consistent with these findings, a 
violent death99 resulted in an average award of $1,742,967 (a median of 
 
 97. Fontenot ex rel. Turner v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00125 (W.D.N.C. July 19, 
2011). 
 98. Because there were only two products-liability cases, these results were excluded 
from Table 3.  Likewise, because the amount recovered in one medical-malpractice case 
could not be obtained, that case was excluded from Table 3. 
 99. All of the motor-vehicle accident cases in our dataset were “violent.”  The 
intentional-tort cases were also labeled as violent, since they each involved the tort of 
battery.  In contrast, very few of the medical-malpractice cases were labeled as violent.  
Some, but not all, of the “other negligence” cases qualified as violent.  
18
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss3/8
2015] WHAT IS A LIFE WORTH? 515 
$1,367,500), while a nonviolent death resulted in a lower average award of 
$958,371 (a median of $400,000).  
The data also suggest that conceding liability saved money.  In the 
forty-three cases in which liability was conceded (or thought to be likely), 
the average award was $1,087,389 (a median of $490,000).  In cases where 
liability was contested, the average award was $1,540,904 (a median of 
$600,000).  Of course, this sort of analysis does not take into account the 
cases in which no award was made at all.  It does suggest, however, that 
choosing to contest liability comes with a price.   
In spite of the great range of the verdicts and settlements, it would be 
misleading to think that the results are completely random.  For example, 
the age of the deceased correlates with the amount of the “global” awards.  
The relationship is negative and statistically significant (p < .01).  This 
suggests, in other words, that the value of a young person’s life is worth 
more than the value of an older person’s life.   
V. DISCUSSION 
Although the injury in each of the cases was the same, the results 
obtained varied greatly.  Every empirical study of wrongful-death cases has 
noted great variation in results.100  Is this a problem?  If one’s perspective is 
horizontal equity—the view that compensation for the same injury should 
be roughly the same, regardless of who the deceased was, or how the 
deceased died—then the variation in the results is troublesome.101  One can, 
however, take a different view, suggested by the preceding description of 
the many different ways that the deceased in this study died.  The many 
ways that one can die suggests that every case is different.102  The 
circumstances will be different, and, of course, the identity of the deceased 
will be different.  The imagined levels of pre-death pain and suffering will 
also vary, depending, among other things, on the length of the interval 
between injury and death and the intensity of the accident that led to the 
death.103  
The disparity in results between jury verdicts and settlements is 
substantial and hard to ignore.  However, because the number of jury 
verdicts (fifteen) was quite low compared to the number of settlements 
 
 100. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9, at 919–24; Cross & Silver, supra note 9, at 
1890–91; Leebron, supra note 9, at 309–11; Posner & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 544–45.  
 101. See JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW 
125 (forthcoming 2016) (describing issues surrounding “horizontal equity” in tort law).  
 102. See Leebron, supra note 9, at 258. 
 103. See generally Posner & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 542 (noting that “agencies opt for 
uniformity, whereas courts call for a high degree of individuation”). 
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(eighty-nine), the disparity may be due to the much smaller number of 
cases decided by jury.  In any event, the disparity cannot be explained by 
the cause of action involved.  The types of cases tried to a jury were not 
markedly different from the types of cases resolved by settlement.  The 
disparity also cannot be explained by arguing that cases without insurance 
were more likely to go to trial.  When only cases with insurance are 
considered, the results between trial and settlement remain very different.  
It is possible, however, that the existence of insurance still provides an 
answer.  Perhaps in the ten cases with insurance that went to trial, the 
insurer and the plaintiff were simply unable to agree on liability at all.  As a 
result, when the plaintiff wins, higher recoveries can be expected; 
plaintiff’s counsel has not had to “discount” her demand in order to obtain 
a settlement.  Our data support this hypothesis; in only one of the ten cases 
tried to a jury in which insurance was available was liability thought by the 
defense to be likely.  In eight of the ten cases, liability was contested, and 
in the remaining case, we were unable to determine the liability 
assessment.104   
The absence of insurance increases the chances that the defendant will 
be unrepresented.  It also seems likely that the existence, and especially the 
amount, of insurance in a given case affect these results.  For example, if a 
decedent is killed in a collision with a motorist who carries only $100,000 
in liability coverage and the motorist lacks substantial personal assets, the 
decedent’s life may be “valued” at or near $100,000.105  It is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that insurance has a strong influence in determining 
the value of a life.  In this sense, the minimum motor-vehicle liability-
insurance requirement of $30,000 for the death of one person imposed by 
the General Statutes seems inadequate.106    
Recoveries varied by cause of action.107  Looking only at “global” 
cases, the ordering makes some sense.  Intentional torts in the context of 
wrongful death are likely to be violent and repugnant.  Motor-vehicle 
accidents are likely to be violent, but, like accidents, not necessarily 
repugnant.  “Other negligence” can be either violent or nonviolent; in 
contrast, medical malpractice is seldom violent.  Perhaps violent deaths 
evoke more sympathy, or are thought to evoke more sympathy, from jurors.  
The finding that a violent death resulted in average and median awards 
much greater than those for a nonviolent death supports this view. 
 
 104. Results on file with author. 
 105. See Cross & Silver, supra note 9, at 1908 (detailing the effect of insurance on a 
victim’s recovery).   
 106. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (2013). 
 107. Supra Table 3. 
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Less money was paid when the defendant privately viewed liability as 
certain or likely.  However, our data do not take into account the cases in 
which no award was made at all.  In those cases, liability was likely 
contested.  Perhaps this means that there is a price for choosing to contest 
liability.  It also suggests the influence of insurance and the adjusting 
process.  
We found a negative correlation between age and the amount 
recovered, meaning that in general, as age increased, the amount of the 
award declined.  Using economic analysis only, this result might seem 
surprising.  The projected earnings of a middle-aged man with an 
expectation of working another twenty or thirty years should easily exceed 
the projected earnings of a teenager who has never worked full-time.  As 
discussed above, however, because the statute permits consideration of 
factors other than projected earning, room remains for noneconomic 
adjustments.  A number of the decedents in our study had either little or no 
income, yet their estates recovered substantial amounts.108  In any event, 
this finding is consistent with other studies.109  
Males did better than females.  When children survived the 
decedent—regardless of their age—the award tended to increase.  The 
average and median awards varied greatly by marital status.  Single adults 
fared best, followed by minors, married individuals, divorced individuals, 
and widowed individuals.  This otherwise-surprising result may be largely 
due to age rather than marital status.  The average age for a single 
individual was just over thirty-three years (a median of just over thirty 
years), but for a married individual, the average age was fifty-two years (a 
median of forty-nine years).  The average age of divorced individuals was 
just over fifty-nine years (a median of fifty-nine years), while the average 
age of widowed individuals was eighty-one years (a median of eighty-eight 
years).  These results make some sense, since age is negatively correlated 
with the amount of recovery. 
One other factor may help to explain the variation, and it merits 
further investigation.  Every estate in this study was represented by an 
attorney, as were most of the defendants.  Perhaps the relative skill of the 
attorneys in a given case explains much of the variation.  The fact that most 
of the cases were resolved by negotiated settlement makes that suspicion 
more plausible. 
 
 108. See, e.g., supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing awards to the estates of 
decedents who were in nursing homes, presumably not making any income). 
 109. See Cross & Silver, supra note 9, at 1914–15.  
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CONCLUSION 
On first impression, the results from the data seem random.  If the 
injury (death) is the same, why are the recoveries so different in amount?  
On further inspection of the data, some revealing patterns emerge.  First, 
age is negatively correlated with the amount recovered.  In general, the 
estates of younger decedents receive more than the estates of older 
decedents.  Second, how the amount was recovered seems to matter.  Jury 
verdicts produced much-higher recoveries than settlements did.  Third, how 
the decedent died makes a difference.  Violent deaths, such as those from 
motor-vehicle accidents, yielded larger amounts than did nonviolent deaths.  
Left unexplored for now is the link between the skill of the plaintiff’s 
attorney and the eventual recovery for the estate. 
Perhaps the most important pattern is also the most obvious one: the 
importance of insurance.  Most of the defendants in the cases were insured.  
As noted above, this is probably not a coincidence.  More troublesome is 
the next question: To what extent do insurance limits determine the value 
of a life wrongfully taken?  The answer, at least for most causes of action, 
seems to be that the liability-insurance limits that a defendant carries define 
the upper limit on the value of a life wrongfully taken.  
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